Aretē

Nowadays, it is relatively undisputed that the world's atmosphere should be considered a limited resource. If we accept John Locke's justification of the acquisition of private property, we run into the well-known ‘tragedy of the commons’. If everyone acts in a purely self-interested way with respect to the atmosphere, the limited resource will inevitably be consumed beyond ‘enough and as good’ for all. Hence, we are presented with two problems. First, we must find a way to distribute the limited resource in an equitable way. Then we must examine the current distribution and rectify any injustices therein. The Kyoto Protocol of 1997 is an attempt at solving these problems. For the purposes of this paper, I will look at these problems in reverse order.

As Peter Singer points out in ‘One Atmosphere’, “it is common to follow Robert Nozick in distinguishing between ‘historical’ principles and ‘time-slice’ principles” in identifying injustices in a distribution (30). Once it is determined which countries ‘owe’ atmosphere to the rest of the world, we can then determine how payment can be made. A historical principle looks for injustices in the initial acquisition of a resource and any subsequent transactions of it in determining whether the current distribution is just. A time-slice principle simply considers the current distribution, regardless of how that distribution came to be, and applies some principles of fairness. If we are to adopt a historical principle of justice for the atmosphere, we must hold accountable any country that doesn't leave ‘enough and as good’ atmosphere for others in its initial acquisition of the atmosphere (i.e., its emission of greenhouse gasses). A time-slice principle seems as though it would be easier to apply, as it requires no knowledge of the history of the emission of greenhouse gasses. For this reason, and because the Kyoto Protocol follows a time-slice principle, in my discussion of the first problem from above, I will limit myself to time-slice principles.

In solving the problem of determining an equitable distribution of the atmosphere, we must first be able to quantify every individual's consumption of it. Practically, this need not mean every individual human being, but an average number for the subjects of a policy-making body (country) should suffice. Once we are able to quantify consumption, we can then compare the consumption of every individual and hopefully identify any injustices. Singer presents two ways of quantifying consumption, both of them as ratios dividing the total emission of greenhouse gasses by some quantity for a given country.

The first way divides total emission by population. The idea here is that no individual person has a greater claim to the atmosphere than any other person, and so no country may emit more greenhouse gasses per capita than any other country. The obvious caveat here is that in order to provide incentive for population control, we must adopt a fixed number for population ahead of time, and provide incentives for meeting that number. If we allow population to grow unchecked, it would place undesirable burdens on countries with declining or no population change, because the total amount of consumable atmosphere is fixed.

The second way divides total emission by unit of economic activity. This is the view Singer claims best explains Candidate Bush's announcement of his administration's policy on climate change in the 2000 presidential debates (43). The argument here is that an unequal distribution of the atmosphere is justified in that it raises the level of the least-well-off. This Rawlsian conception of justice is an attempt to avoid the ‘leveling down’ objection to strict egalitarian distributions. Bush's argument can be interpreted as a justification for the United States' disproportionate consumption of atmosphere on the grounds that such consumption actually benefits the poorest countries because of its higher economic production rate.

Once we decide on a number to represent a country's consumption of the atmosphere, we can identify and decide on a way to rectify injustices. The Kyoto Protocol does these things by treating atmospheric consumption as an economic entity. Since the main concern is limiting the total amount of world emission of greenhouse gasses, it makes sense to allow countries to buy, sell, and trade units of emission on the market. Not only does this provide countries with low emission an incentive to keep their emissions low, it also stimulates the economy. The only question left is which method of quantifying atmospheric consumption is more compelling.

It is probably safe to assume that both Singer and Bush would agree to the claim that a strict egalitarian distribution is desirable, barring any strong reason for inequality. Singer interprets Bush's argument as a reason for allowing inequality on the grounds that such inequality actually benefits the least-well-off, and so avoids the ‘leveling down’ effect. However, as Singer points out, “the primary beneficiaries of US production are the residents of the United States itself” (44). In order to accept Bush's justification, it would need to be shown that the inequality it allows actually benefits the least-well-off. Since “89 percent of [the goods and services that the United States produces] are consumed in the United States,” and “many residents of other countries… cannot afford to buy goods produced in the United States,” it seems Bush's justification fails (44). So whether or not we believe that any inequality can be justified by the beneficence of the least-well-off, the argument fails to do what Bush wants it to. While I agree with Bush and Rawls in that inequality can be justified by an increase in the minimum level of good, to show that a disproportionate emission of greenhouse gasses actually benefits the least-well-off seems a very tall order.

As we have seen, both methods of quantifying the consumption of the world's atmosphere have their problems. Dividing total emission of greenhouse gasses by population has negative implications if population is allowed to grow unchecked. Dividing it by economic output at first appears a good method because it encourages efficiency, and is supposed to raise up the poor. The problem with population growth can be avoided by adopting a fixed number for population and providing incentives for meeting or beating that number. Because of the difficulties involved in correlating disproportionate emission levels with economic beneficence of poor countries, it appears that the former method is more practical, and so those countries who emit more greenhouse gasses per capita than the average must either buy emission credits from those countries below the average, or lower their emission levels in order to maintain current rates of emission. That it happens to be the richest countries who bear the burden is a mere matter of consequence.

last updated 2 years ago #